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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
LELAND \V. SIMPER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.-

Civil No. 8305

HARRY THORSEN and MILDRED
THORSEN, husband and wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS

This is an action to recover damages wherein the
Plaintiff, Leland W. Simper, alleged that the Defendants
Harry Thorsen and wife, had unlawfully appropriated
and diverted to their own use and benefit certain waters
belonging to the Plaintiff. Defendants admitted the use
and apvropriation of said water but denied that Plaintiff owned any right, title or interest therein. By way
of Counterclaim Defendants alleged that they were the
owners of certain real vroperty and appurtenant water
rights situated in Sevier County, State of lJtah, and
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Defendants prayed that their title in and to said appurtenant water rights be quieted as against any and all
adverse claims of the Plaintiff. Defendants further
prayed for damages by reason of Plaintiff's unlawful
use and appropriation of said water.
Defendants appeal from a Decree of the lower Court
which determined that Plaintiff is the sole owner of
certain of said water rights and in which the Court refused to decree ownership of certain other of said water
rights to either Plaintiff or Defendants. Appellants also
appeal from the Order of said Court denying their :Motion for a New Trial. Appellants contend that the lower
Court corrunitted reversable error at law and has misapplied proven facts, that the Court's Decree (R. 18-19)
is contrary to all the admissible evidence and 1nust be
reversed, and that a new Decree should be entered in
Defendants' favor.
STATE~fENT

OF FACTS

The Defendants since 1946 haYe been the owners of
and in possession of a certain ranch located at Gooseberry, Salina Canyon, State of Utah, and located South
of the Plaintiff's farn1. (See Exhibits "A'', "B", "C"
and ''G"). The Defendants grow grain and alfalfa and
graze sheep and cattle on their ranch. At the time they
took possession and obtained title to said property the
Defendants also obtained certain water rights for use
on the ranch. In addition to the Gooseberry Creek Water
used jointl~T by Defendants and Plaintiff and other landSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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owners 1n the area, which water is not involved
in this litigation, the Defendants obtained title to a
portion of a certain Spring Area which is located immediately South of the 'South Boundary line of their
property. This is the area shown in blue on Exhibit
"A" and is referred to therein as "Spring Area No. 1."
This area is composed of several distinct springs,
each one of which has a well defined channel running
from it. The Spring located at the immediate Northwest
Corner of Spring Area N" o. 1 flows out of a pipe and
follows a natural channel a short distance into a pond
shown on Defendants' Exhibit "A" and referred to as
the Ernel Peterson Pond. This particular spring of
water will hereinafter be referred to as the ''piped
spring." Thereafter, all of the water from said piped
spring flows out of the pond and into "C" Ditch (Exhibit
··A") where it intermingles with Gooseberry Creek water
and subsequently flows in a Northerly direction down a
wash and eventually finds its way to the Plaintiff's land.
The Defendants make no claim wha.tever to any of the
u·ater flowing from the Ernel Peterson Pond.
Also flowing out from Spring Area No. 1 are waters
through two additional channels. Both of these water
sources have well-defined channels running therefrom as
shown on Exhibit ''A". The water flowing from these
two springs goes on to Defendants' land immediately
Korth of Spring Area No. 1, where it is beneficially used
and employed by Defendants for crop and pasture irrigation.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Also, the Defendants clain1 title to an additional
Spring Area designated on Defendants' Exhibit "A" as
"Spring Area No. 2". This area consists of a number of
"seeps" from which a small quantity of water flows on
to adjoining land owned by the Defendants. Since the
year 1946, they have maintained a pasture for animals
on this tract. Defendant Thorsen testified (R. 293) that
it was his understanding and 'belief from the terms and
provisions of his Deed to said property and from oral
representations made to him that Spring Areas 1 and
2 were appurtenant to his land and that he obtained title
thereto at the time he purchased said farm property.
During the month of ~fay, A.D. 1951, Defendants
began for the first time to have trouble with the Plaintiff regarding this water. Both of the ditches at Spring
Area No. 1 which conveyed water to Defendants' land
were cut and dammed off and the water therefrom diverted to the Plaintiff through the Ernel Peterson Pond
and "C'' Ditch. This occurred approxi1nately twenty
( 20) times during the summer of 19·51, and as a result
most of the water from Spring Area No. 1 failed to reach
Defendants' land. The Plaintiff acknowledged that he
was responsible for the cutting and damming off of the
ditches, and asserted to the Defendants that he claimed
exclusive right, title and interest in and to all of the
water flowing frmn Spring Areas 1 and 2. This was the
first ti1ne that Plaintiff had asserted such a claim although he and Defendants had been neighbors for more
than five ( 5) years during which time Defendants had
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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used on their land all of the water from Spring Areas
1 and 2 except for the piped spring. The dispute culminated with the filing of the Complaint herein on September 19, 1951.
Although the Plaintiff asked only for damages, and
not for a Decree quieting title, the Court made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree in Plaintiff's favor quieting Plaintiff's title to all
of Spring Area No. 1, including all of the several water
sources embraced therein. The Court refused to make
any award whatever either to Plaintiff or to Defendants
with respect to Spring Area No. 2.
The testimony and evidence concerning the issues
raised herein is voluminous and will be reviewed in detail in connection with the arguments hereinafter made.
STATE~fENT

OF POINTS

POINT NO.1
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
BRANCH SPRING EMBRACES ALL OF SPRING AREA NO.
1 AND INCLUDES ALL THE WATER SOURCES THEREIN
AND IN FINDING THAT BRANCH SPRING IS THE SAME
WATER SOURCE AS BIG SPRING.

POINT NO.2
THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE
FINDING OF THE .COURT THAT THOMAS W. SIMPER, ONE
OF THE PLAINTIFF'S PREDECESSORS IN TITLE, ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP OF ALL WATERS ARISING FROM
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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SAID BRANCH SPRING (ERRONEOUSLY DESCRIBED BY
THE COURT AS INCLUDING ALL OF SPRING AREA NO.1),
BY A CERTAIN DEED EXECUTED BY ONE CHARLES A.
MOTT.

POINT NO.3
THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE
FINDING OF THE ·COURT THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS THE
OWNER AND ENTITLED TO THE POSSESSION AND USE
ON HIS LAND OF ALL THE WATERS FROM BRANCH
SPRING, WHICH THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED WAS THE SAME AS AND EMBRACED ALL OF
SPRING AREA NO. 1 AND INCLUDED ALL THE WATER
SOURCES THEREIN.

POINT NO.4
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING AND
OVERRULING THE OBJECTIONS OF DEFENDANTS TO
THE INTRODUCTION IN EVIDENCE OF PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBITS 1 TO 4, BOTH INCLUSIVE, AND THAT THE
COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR NONSUIT.

POINT NO.5
THAT THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING
AND REFUSING TO FIND, CONCLUDE AND DECREE
THAT THE DEFENDANTS ABOVE-NAMED ARE THE
OWNERS OF ALL WATERS ARISING FROM SPRING AREA
NO. 1, EXCEPT FOR THE ONE WATER SOURCE LOCATED
IN THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF SAID AREA AND ·COMMONLY REFERRED TO AS "BRANCH SPRING", AND REFERRED TO ABOVE AS THE PIPED SPRING.

POINT NO.6
THAT THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND
REFUSING TO FIND, CONCLUDE AND DECREE THAT
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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THE DEFENDANTS ABOVE NAMED ARE THE OWNERS
OF ALL OF THE WATERS ARISING FROM THAT CERTAIN
AREA KNOWN AND DESCRIBED AS "SPRING AREA NO.
2" AS DESCRIBED IN THE PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE
IN THIS .CAUSE AND AS SHOWN ON DEFENDANTS' EXHIBIT "A".

POINT NO.7
THAT THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL IN THIS
CAUSE.

POINT NO.8
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
FIND IN DEFENDANTS' FAVOR UPON THE ISSUE OF
DEFENDANTS' DAMAGES.

ARGUMENT
POINT NO.1
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
BRANCH SPRING EMBRACES ALL OF SPRING AREA NO.
1 AND INC-LUDES ALL THE WATER SOURCES THEREIN
AND IN FINDING THAT BRANCH SPRING IS THE SAME
WATER SOURCE AS BIG SPRING.

It should be stated at the outset that there are involved in this controversy two distinct groups of water
sources. The first group is represented by the following
water sources, to-wit:
GROUP I:
1. The Spring located at the immediate North-

west Corner of Spring Area No. 1, which we refer
to as the piped spring.
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2. Reservoir No. 2 as specifically described in
Exhibit No. "3".
3. The regular Gooseberry Creek water which
flows across Defendants' land and on to Plaintiff's
land through ''C" Ditch as shown on Exhibit "A".

GROUP II:
1. The remaining water sources found in Spring
Area No.1.
2. Spring Area No. 2.
Appellants desire to make it clear at the very beginning that, as between the Plaintiff and the Defendants,
there is no dispute or contest regarding the waters belonging to Group I above described. Appellants make
no claim whatever to any of these water rights, except
to their association shares in and to the regular Gooseberry Creek water, which said water rights are not contested herein. It is now and always has been the Defendants' position that these waters are not involved in
this litigation. Defendants clain1 title only to the two
water sources included in Group II above referred to
and take the position that this action must be limited to
a determination of issues involving the second group of
water rights only.
Appellants contend that the Findings and Decree
of the lower Court, as well as its Decision and ~femoran
dunl of August 1, 1953 (R. 10-19), together with its Order
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Overruling :Motion for a New ~Crial dated November 19,
1954, ( R. 21 - 22) all clearly show that the Court failed
and refused to make any distinction whatever in the
identity of water rights involved and that the Court has
erroneously assunwd that all of the waters found within
the physical boundaries of Spring Area No. 1 are the
Branch Spring and that the Branch Spring is synonymous with the Big Spring. This confusion of the Court
and its failure to properly interpret the testimony and
Exhibits with reference to the identity of the water rights
involved is largely responsible for the award to Plaintiff
of all of Spring Area No. 1 upon the unfounded assumption that the entire area covered by Spring Area No. 1 is
the same water source as the Big Spring and the Branch
Spring referred to in Plaintiff's Exhibits, and that Big
Spring and Branch Spring refer to the same water.
I

As a matter of fact this lawsuit is waged over the
rights of the respective parties to Spring Areas No. 1
and 2 as shown in Exhibit "A", but Plaintiff insists that
these areas are the same as the waters described in his
Exhibits "1 to 4", both inclusive. These Exhibits constitute Plaintiff's purported chain of title upon the said
water. Appellants' position with respect to these instruments is simply this, to-wit:
They are completely incompetent and inadmiss-ible
to establish amy title to either portion of Spring Areas
1 or 2 involv,ed in this litigation, for the simp,le re1ason

that they refer to other ond describe different sources
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of water completely sepa.rate from and not in amy way
part of Spring Areas 1 or 2, except for the one Branch
or piped spring about whi.ch there is no controversy.
11Joreover, ev.en if they ,actually did describe t.he waters
invol·ved in this action, which we deny, said Deeds and
M emora.nd'a are not sufficient, staJY~;ding alon.e, to establish title in the Plaintiff to said waters.

Appellants concede that "The Branch Spring of
Water'' described in Exhibit "3", is situated in and is a
part of Spring Area No. 1. However, the Court has assun1ed that because it is located within Spring Area
No. 1, Branch Spring must of necessity be all of Spring
Area No. 1. The Court also erroneously determined
that Branch Spring and Big Spring are identical
water sources. On the basis of such an assumption,
the Court not only quieted Plaintiff's title to that water
in Spring Area No. 1 which the Plaintiff admittedly owns
(the piped spring), but also handed to the Plaintiff the
waters in Spring Area No. 1 which belong to the Defendants. The error of this assumption is apparent from a
consideration of the following:
1. The testimony of the Defendant Harry Thorsen.

(R. 138 - 140) and Frank Casto (R. 164), and John

~I.

Bird (R. :23-t) that Spring Area No. 1 is composed of
several separate, well-defined water sources, all of which
ha Ye well-nmrked channels going out of the area in
different directions.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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2. The testimony concerning the physical topography of Spring Area No. 1 which shows that the water
channel from the piped spring goes out of Spring Area
No. 1 at a lower elevation than the channels from the
other sources in Spring Area No. 1, (R. 140) and that
while the other channels convey water directly to the
Defendants' land, the water from the piped spring falls
off in to a pond and then down into the wash at the bottom
of the canyon ("C" ditch on Exhibit "A") from which it
eventually flows onto Plaintiff's land, through diversion
from said wash.
3. The undisputed testimony of Defendant Harry
Thorsen, his predecessor in title and possession of his
farm, John 1\L Bird, and Frank Casto and Janie Nielsen,
the son and daughter of the original homesteader of the
Thorsen Farm, whose cumulative acquaintance with the
topography and use of the land and water goes back to
the year 1887 (R. 1:>7 and 180), that these physical conditions have existed, except for the construction of the
Ernel Peterson Pond, for sixty-four (64) years, and that
the various distinct and separate water channels leading
out from Spring Area No. 1 have not changed substantially during that period of time.

±.

The fact that Plaintiff's own testimony generally confir111~ these physical facts (R. 4-l-, +:>, and 60-7-l- ),
including Plaintiff"s admissions that the only direction
the water from the ''piped spring" can take i~ into the
main channel ("C" Ditch shown on Exhibit "A") and
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then on to Plaintiff's land; that the water from the piped
Spring has flowed upon Plaintiff's land ever since Plaintiff has been acquainted with the area (R. 94) and that
his use of this water has never been materially interrupted or interfered with (R. 81); and most important,
that during the years the Defendants have owned the
property immediately North of the Spring Area No. 1,
and for at least part of the time the land was owned by
John M. Bird prior to Mr. Thorsen, the water from the
sources within the Spring Area No. 1 other than the piped
spring flowed on to the lands now owned by the Defendants (R. 95 - 98).
5. The significant facts that Plaintiff's Exhibits 2,
3 and 4 upon which they must rely to establish their title
to the water of Spring Area No. 1 uses the language o.f
two separate isolated water sources.
We quote fr01n Exhibit "3", to-wit:
''The branch spring of water lying and being
situate at the lower end of Kelsey Bird's field,
Gooseberry Prect. 'Sevier County, Ut .... "
"Also, Reservoir No. 2, with ditch situated
near two hwndred yards west of what is generally
known as Big 8 pring and near one mile 1m a
southerly direction from the old Ta,ylor D.airy
Ranch, said ditch runninq in a northwesterly direction to and connecting with the head of Gooseberry Greek ..."
This wording clearly indicates that the parties to
the l\Iott-Simper Deed were dealing with one water
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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source (the branch spring) in one area and wjth another
separate water source (Reservoir No. 2) in an entirely
different area. This is conclusively established by the
fact that Spring Area No. 1 at the lower end of the Kelsey Bird field (and which includes the Branch or piped
spring) is located in the Southwest quarter of Section
19, Township 22 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian. (See Exhibit "A"). However, Big Spring,
Taylor Dairy Ranch and the headwaters of Gooseberry
Creek, points used in the ~[ott-Simper Deed to establish
the location of Reservoir No. 2, were fixed by John l\I.
Bird, a rangerider in said area for the Brown's Hole
Grazing Association, with long experience in the area,
as being in Section 23, Township 23 South, Range 2 East,
Salt Lake Base and l\feridian, approximately 8 miles
South of the area in conflict, (R. 225 - 229).
Also, Lucius Gates, who had herded sheep in the
Gooseberry country for many years, estimated Big
Spring, Taylor Dairy Ranch and Reservoir No. 2 to
be at least 6 miles South of the Thorsen property, (R.
286), and Frank Casto, the son of the original homesteader on the Thorsen property, who had a wide experience in the Gooseberry area, fixed the distance at 8
miles removed (R. 176 - 179). Most important, Exhibit
"F", the official map of Sevier County, Utah, clearly
shows that the testimony of these witnesses is confirmed
as a matter of geographical fact.
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The only possible basis for the Court's award of all
of the waters of Spring Area No. 1 to the Plaintiff would
be Plaintiff's testimony that he has always considered
that "the Branch Spring" included all of the waters from
Spring Area No. 1 without requiring him to prove any
appropriation under the law of any such waters.
Appellants assert that the evidence clearly and unequivocably demonstrates that "the Branch spring of
water" in Exhibit ''3" refers to and includes only the one
piped spring at the Northwest corner of Spring Area No.
1, that the other sources within Spring Area No. 1 are
separate and distinct therefrom, and that Reservoir No.
2 is a water source removed some 8 miles from the area
in dispute. The Court's failure and refusal to so find,
in the face of the undeniable evidence to the contrary,
seriously prejudiced Defendants herein, for they have
from the beginning disclaimed any title in themselves to
the one piped spring and to Reservoir No. 2, and if no
distinction is to be recognized between water sources
disputed and conceded, it is a constant temptation to the
Court to close its eyes and ears to the testimony and evidence in the erroneous belief that Defendants have
conceded that they do not own any of the water rights
involved in this action.
POINT NO.2
THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE
FINDING OF THE ·COURT THAT THOMAS W. SIMPER, ONE
OF THE PLAINTIFF'S PREDECESSORS IN TITLE, ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP OF ALL WATERS ARISING FROM
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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SAID BRANCH SPRING (ERRONEOUSLY DESCRIBED BY
THE COURT AS INCLUDING ALL OF SPRING AREA N0.1),
BY A CERTAIN DEED EXECUTED BY ONE CHARLES A.
MOTT.

POINT NO.3
THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE
FINDING OF THE .COURT THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS THE
OWNER AND ENTITLED TO THE POSSESSION AND USE
ON HIS LAND OF ALL THE WATERS FROM BRANCH
SPRING, WHICH THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED WAS THE SAME AS AND EMBRACED ALL OF
SPRING AREA NO. 1 AND INCLUDED ALL THE WATER
SOURCES THEREIN.

POINT NO.4
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING AND
OVERRULING THE OBJECTIONS OF DEFENDANTS TO
THE INTRODUCTION IN EVIDENCE OF PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBITS "1" TO "4", BO'rH INCLUSIVE, AND THAT THE
COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR NONSUIT.

Points 2, 3 and 4 above set forth will be argued
jointly herein.
Appellants assert that the Plaintiff, in order to
recover upon his Complaint, must establish ownership
in the water rights he claims have been interfered with
by the Defendants. We acknowledge also that Defendants, on their Counterclaim, must do more than establish
the nonexistence or inferiority of Plaintiff's title, and
that in order to prevail upon their Counterclaim DeSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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fendants must ~stablish in themselves title to the waters
descrrbed therein. Sowards et al, vs. M eaqher .et al, 37
Utah 212, 108 P. 1112.
Ownership of rights in water is now a n1atter of
affirmative statutory law (Title 73, Water and I rriqa.tion, Ut.ah Code Annotated 1953). In 1903 the Legislature passed a law providing that in the future the water
of all streams and other public sources in this State,
whether flowing above or underground, was public property, subject, however, to all existing rights to th.e use
t.hereof. (Chapter 100, Laws of Utah 1903.) These statutes provide an exclusive method for establishing rights
in water only after the date of their original enactment,
to-wit: 1903. The Supreme Court of Utah has on numerous occasions held that all rights in water accruing
prior to 1903 must be established pursuant to governing
law prior to 1903. Prior to 1903 the law permitted acqusition of title to water by appropriation and beneficial
use thereof. Patterson vs. Ryan, 37 Utah 410, 108 P.
1118; Jensen vs. Birch Creek Ranch Company, 76 Utah
356, 289 P. 1097 ; Wells ville East Valley Irrigation Company vs. Lindsay Land and Livestock Contpany, 104 Utah
448, 137 P. 2d 634; Wrathall vs. Johnson, 86 Utah 50, 40
p 2d. 755.
In the recent Utah case of Bishop v. Duck Creek Irri-

gation ComJHMzy et. al, 241 P. 2d 162, the Utah Supreme
Court has confirmed the foregoing rule and has held as
follows:
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"Since there are no filings with the State
Engineer either by Bishop or his predecessors,
whatever rights he has to the water must necessarily rest upon appropriation by beneficial us,e
before the year 1903. Prior to that time the law
allowed appropriation by such use, and statutes
enacted that year preserve such appropriation".
We take it, therefore, to be the prevailing law in the
State of Utah, that whoever first appropriated water
by beneficial use thereof prior to 1903 is to be adjudged
the owner thereof and entitled to pass title thereto.
Taking Plaintiff's evidence in its most favorable
light, it is at once apparent that his claim to ownership of the waters in dispute, is grounded entirely upon
written instrun1ents (Exhibits "1" to "4", both inclusive).
The effect of Exhibits "1", ":2" and"-!", insofar as vesting
in the Plaintiff the title to any water rights is concerned,
hinges upon the question as to whether or not Charles A.
:Jiott, the Grantor in Exhibit ''3 ", had any title to waters
to convey to his Grantee, Thomas W. Simper, the Plaintiff's predecessor in interest. In view of the fact that the
record shows that none of Plaintiff's witnesses had any
actual acquaintance with either the real property now
owned by the Plaintiff or the waters in dispute in this
action, prior to the )'ear 1908, as will be discussed in dPtail hereinafter, Plaintiff must rely upon said instruments to establish his title. We take it as obvious, therefore, that if I >Jain tiff's Exhibit "3" is not effective a1-: c1-:Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tablishing ownership to water rights and transferring
the same, then Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie
case of ownership of water rights prior to 1903, and his
Exhibits 1 to 4 are not admissible.
Exhibit ''3" is a Deed to certain described water rights.
The instrument is dated December 31,1888. Passing over
the matter of the identity of the waters described in the
~1ott-Si1nper Deed, which we have heretofore discussed
in this Brief, and assuming for the purpose of argument
that the instrument described the water sources which
are actually in controversy between the Plaintiff and
the Defendants, w·hich we expressly deny, neverthless
we most earne'stly contend that said '''Vater Deed",
standinq alone, is absolutely ineffectual as proof of
ownership of water rights. Said instrument is entirely
a self-serving unsupported declaration and passes no
interest in water rights under the Utah Law in the absence of proof of such appropriation and beneficial use
thereof by the Grantor therein as would establish ownership of the waters in himself under the laws of Utah
prior to 1903.
As above set forth, the Law prior to 1903 was simply
one of acquisition of rights in waters by appropriation
through beneficial use. The Jaw recognized no certification or recording of such rights; it was aU a 1natter of
proof of use, not a chain of paper title. An examination
of the historical developn1ent of water rights in Utah
prior to 1903 and a consideration of the cases hereinSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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above cited will, we feel, convince the Court that when
water rights are contested, the only competent and admissible evidence going to the establishn1ent of such
rights prior to 1903 is evidence of actual physical appropriation and beneficial use. Deeds and memoranda
of a self-serving nature, which assert ownership but do
not prove it, such as the Mott-Simper Deed and Plaintiff's Exhibits "1'', ''2'' and "-1:", are and ought to be incompetent and inadmissible as proof of ownership of
water where the title of the water is in controversy.
Appellants further contend that the provisions of
78-25-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, providing for the

reading into evidence of all instruments affecting real
property which are properly acknowledged, without
proof of execution, does not avail Plaintiff anything because the crux of the matter is not the execution of the
~lott-Nimper

Deed (Exhibit "3") or its genuineness as an

instrument, but rather, proof of appropriation and beneficial use of water upon land. If such were not the case,
any person could, prior to 1903, by the act of executing
a Water Deed, establish his rights and those of his
Grantee to ownership of water without any valid apcontnn~T to

publie

policy and the history of the development of water

right~

propriation thereof. Such a device is

in this State. The title a Grantee secures depends on the
title his Grantor had, and such Grantor's title mu;;;t Jw
established and proved.
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Appellant's position is well stated in K inrney on
Irrigation and Water Rights, Second Edition, Follllnc
3, 8ection 1554, page 2803, to-wit:
"Upon the one asserting a claim to the right
to the use of water regardless upon what he bases
his right, _rests the burden of proving his claim as
set up in his pleadings by a preponderance of all
of the evidence admitted in the case on the point in
question. And although a Plaintiff under a claim
of general ownership may prove his title to the
right by appropriation, adverse possession and
user, or purchase, all of the essential elements of
the acquisition of his right must be proven according to the nature of the claim which he makes
to it. Therefore, if the theory of his claim is that
of prior appropriation, he must prove all of the
elements which are necessary to make a prior
appropriation, including the beneficial use of all
of the water claimed ... If he base·s his claim upon
a purchase from an appropriator, he must not
only prove a valid .appropriation by his Grantor,
but he must also prove his right to his claim by
proving the purchase."
See the cases of St. George & Washington Canal Co.
vs. Hurricane Canal Co. 93 Utah 262, 72 P. 2d. 642; S.aliM
Creek Irriga.tion Co. rs. Salina Stock Co. 7 Utah 456, 27

P. 578; Campbell

L'.

Nunn, 78 Utah 316 2 P. 2d 899,

Bi ...,·hol' v. D11ck Creek Irrigation Company, supra, where

these rules are applied to differing factual situations.
What then is the nature and extent of Plaintiff's
proof of appropriation of the water in controversy¥
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Plaintiff asserted during his direct examination that
he had been using all of the water from Spring Area No.
1 on his farrn ever since his purchase in 1930 (R. 42).
However, under Cross-Examination Plaintiff changed his
story and admitted that while he had used all of the
water which had come down to his farm through the main
channel (' 'C" Ditch on Exhibit "A") from out of the
Frands Peterson Fish Pond, and that this has never been
interfered with (R. 81 and 93), the remainder of the
\\·ater frmn Spring Area No. 1, (which is the water really
involved in this controversy) has gone to the Defendants'
land both during Defendants' period of ownership and
also during the ownership of J'ohn }.f. Bird, Defendants'
predecessor in Title (R. 92 to 97)
George Thomas Simper, Plaintiff's brother, testified
that his knowledge of the situation went back to the year
1908 and extended up to the year 1945 (R. 100). Although
Simper maintained that the water had ah\·a~·~ been used
on the Mott-Simper property from out of the main
channel ("C" Ditch on Exhibit "A"), nevertheless, he
conceded that at least part of the water from Spring Area
No. 1, during all of the 37-year period fron1 1908 to 1945,
may have been used by Abel ~l. Ca~to on his homestead,
which is the same property as now owned by the Defendants (R. 104-106).
We quote directly from the record (R. 109) :
"Q. (By .Mr. Mattsson) : Now, i~n't it a f'ad
.\Ir. Sin1per, that at all times during the hi~tor;
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of this, as far back as you can rernen1ber, that the
water from these Branch Springs, \vith exception
of that Pipe Spring, has gone onto ~Ir. Thorsen's
spring (land) or his predecessors', the people
before him?
"A.

(By George Thomas Sin1per): It mav have
been, all bu't the Pipe system, but the. piped
system didn't.

Q.

The Pipe system went into tlus channel?

A.

That's right.

Q.

And all of the other water rnay have gone into
this ditch?

A.

That's right.

Q.

And that is true back as far as vou can remember, back to 1910 or 1908?
·

A.

That's right."

Plaintiff's next witness, Rene Curtis, stated that
he worked for Plaintiff's father on the Simper property
forty years ago, or in

191~,

and that his knowledge of

the situation goes back no further than this time (R. 112).
As with Plaintiff's other witness, Curtis rnaintained that
the Simper people used all of the water which reached
their land through the rnain channel but Curtis, like the
others of Plaintiff's witnesses, acknowledged that except
for the regular Gooseberry Creek \Yater and the water
frorn the one piped spring, all of the other Simper water
was in fact waste water fron1 off the Casto-Thorsen farm.
IIere is another dear-cut adrnission that as early as 1912
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water from Spring Area No. 1 was being used on Defendants' premises. We quote again from the record at Page
113, to-wit:
"Q.

(By ~Ir. 1Iattsson) : Now, does the Gooseberry Creek water come in that same draw?

A.

(B~, :Mr. Curtis): It came from the springs,
from the waste water is what it was.

Q. It was the waste water you said 1
A.

Off the Abe Casto farm.

Q. It was the waste water from the Abe Casto
farm?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. In other words, :Jlr. Curtis, this water was
used on the Abe Casto farm and then the
waste water went into this channel or this
draw and it went down to the Simpers' place,
is that correct 1
A.

That is the way it was, yes, sir."

Harry 1\:Iiller, also a witness for Plaintiff, testified
that he worked on Plaintiff's farm about 23 years ago
and that he irrigated the Simper farm from water coming down the main channel (R. 125). On Cross-Examination ::\(illt•r admitted that this water consisted of ( Joo~Pberry Creek flow (not involved in this litigation), and
some "Spring Water", the identity or sonr<'e of which
he did not know (R. 126).
This same witness also testified that after I><'I'Pndant
bought his fann he worked for Defendant and

~rhorsen
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irrigated Defendant's farn1 with water flowing from out
of Spring Area No. 1 (R. 126). The water reached the
Thorsen property through two well-established ditches
(R. 127).
Frands Peterson testified that his son Ernel Peterson is now the record owner of the "Kelsey Bird field"
referred to in the :Mott-Si1nper Deed (Exhibit No. "3")
in the Northwest corner of which Spring Area No. 1 is
located. 1Ir. Peterson has lived in a s1nall cabin near
Spring Area No. 1 for about 12 years (R. 115). Peterson
stated that he had no knowledge whatever concerning the
water situation prior to about 1940, but that at the time
he n1oved into the cabin, "there was a big stream of water
and it was going right down the main channel", (R.120).
On Cross-Examination he acknowledged that the stream
contained high water run-off, Gooseberry Creek water
and waste water frmn off his land. But the following
frmn l\Ir. Peterson's testi1nony is so significant that we
quote it in full frmn the Record (R. 121 and 122) :
··Q.

(By ~fr. ~Iattsson): Now, :Jir. Peterson,
when you first went in there, there were two
ditches, weren't there, extending Northeasterly from this area that is called the Branch
Springsf
~Ir.

A.

(By

Peterson): Yes, sir, two ditches.

Q.

Ditches leading to Thorsen property that he
irrigated frmn those ditches?

A.

Yes, sir.
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Q. And they were there when you moved In
there1
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. And they were used, weren't they?
A.

Yes.

Q. l\Ir. Thorsen used them to take water from
those Spring Areas on to his property and
irrigate iU
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. And he has done it ever since 1
A.

And he ha:s been doing it off and on ever
since.

Q.

\:Veil, whenever he needed to irrigate, hadn't
he1

A. \Veil, I couldn't answer that. I don't know.

Q.

X ow, you moved into this area before :\lr.
Thorsen bought in here, didn't you 1

A.

Q.

Yes, sir.
Now, Jack Bird used the water the same
did he not~

A.

Yes.

Q.

So he used the water out of these Branch
Springs to irrigate this property that ~lr.
Thorsen now owns~

wa)~,

A. Yes, sir."
Peterson also identified the piped spring in A rea
X o. 1 as the one which flows into his fish pond and from

there directly into the main channel (R.123).
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Thus the lower Court had before it the testin1ony of
all four of Plaintiff's witnesses, all of whom at various
times and for various periods, had experience with and
knowledge of the Simper and Thorsen properties and of
Spring Area No. 1, covering a period from 1908 to the
present tin1e. All four witnesses testified that during the
respective periods of time of which they had knowledge,
some water was flowing down the 1nain channel to Plaintiff's property, which is not disputed by Appellants, who
have always acknowledged that the water from the one
piped spring in Spring Area No. 1, from high water runoff, and fr01n his regular Gooseberry Creek rights and
flow, rightfully belongs to Plaintiff. Appellants make no
claim what,ev,er to these waters, nor is there one word

of evidence in the record of any act of interference with
these water rights.
But the startling fact about Plaintiff's case is that
each of said witnesses, and the Plaintiff hi1nself, also
testified that during the 4-l: years covered by their cumulative experience and extending back to the year 1908,
a part of the 1cater from Spring Area No.1 has always '

flou.·,ed

Court

lf}JOJI

the laud

obvjousl~,

ah:-;eJH'P

uo1c

ou·ned by the Defendants. The

ignored this fact as well as the complete

of any testiulOll,\' of actual appropriation and

beneficial use of

an~,

water by Plaintiff's predecessors

in interest prior to the year 1903, as required by law, in
order to establish title in the Plaintiff.
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Therefore, Appellants most earnestly contend that
we are not confronted with the case where the evidence
of Defendants' use and appropriation of water preponderates against that of the Plaintiff (Defendants will
review their own case for appropriation later in this
brief) but we have a situation where Plaintiff's case
for appropriation and beneficial use of water is not supported by any admissible evidence and where Plaintiff's
own case establishes Defendants' use of water from a
part of Spring Area No.1 from 1908 until the trial. There
is absolutely no evidence in the record, admissible or
otherwise, establishing Plaintiff's right to any of the
water from Spring Area No. 1. On the other hand, Plaintiff's own witnesses, taking their testimony in the light
most favorable to him, establish 44 years of beneficial use
by Defendants and their predecessors of the water of
Spring Area X o. 1 except for the piped spring.
At the conclusion of Plaintiff's case, we assert that

the lower Court was required as a matter of law to refuse
a. Decree to either party, because at that point neither
party had yet established a lawful appropriation of water
prior to the year 1903. Defendants went l'orwa nl wlwn
the burden of proof shifted to them and established a ppropriation and beneficial use of water prior to 1903 a~
will be pointed out hereinafter, but we reiterate that a~
the record stood at the end of Plaintiff's ea~P, no }Jrima
facie cansc of action had been proved, and thP Court's
failure and refusal to grant Defendants' ~r otion for Nonsuit, therefore, was palpable error.
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Furtherrnore, the Court in its Decision and Memorandum (R. 10-14) as well as in its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (R. 15-17) obviously based its award
to Plaintiff of all of the waters from Spring Area No. 1
upon Plaintiff's case in chief. This does not represent
a failure by the Court to properly weigh the evidence,
but it is an outright instance of the Court ignoring completely entire pnrtions of Plaintiff's case where it applied
to the Defendants and accepting it even beyond the limits
of remote legal admissibility whenever it applied to the
Plaintiff. Appellants assert that this type of decision
is not in the interest of accomplishing justice and fair
play and that it serves only to deprive one person of a
valuable water right which he legally owns, and to award
the said water to one whose own testimony and evidence
shows him not to be entitled to.
We conclude our attack upon the Plaintiff's case by
simply restating our position:
The Findings, Conclusions, and Decree of the lower
Court should be reversed and new Findings, Conclusions
and Decree should be entered in favor of Defendants as
to all of the water from Spring Area No. 1 except for
the one piped spring at the Northwest Corner thereof:
1.

Because the evidence clearl)· establishes and

proves that "the Branch Spring of water" referred
to in the ~fott-Si1nper Deed is in fact the same water
source as the piped spring over which there is no contest
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as far as Defendants are concerned, and also that Reservoir No. 2 is not part of the water involved in this litigation.
2. Because there is absolutely no competent admissible evidence in the record to support Plaintiff's ownership to any of the other waters of Spring Area No. 1.
3. Because Plaintiff's own evidence establishes
Defendants' beneficial use of all the water of Spring Area
Xo. 1, except for the one piped spring, back to the year
1908. As pointed out below, Defendants' case for appropriation and beneficial user of the water at Spring Area
X o. 1, except for the one piped spring, establishes legal
title in them and their predecessors back to the year
1887, against which there is not one iota of conflicting
evidence in the record.
POINT NO.5
THAT THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING
AND REFUSING TO FIND, CONCLUDE AND DECREE
THAT THE DEFENDANTS ABOVE-NAMED ARE THE
OWNERS OF ALL WATERS ARISING FROM SPRING AREA
NO. 1, EXCEPT FOR THE ONE WATER SOURCE LOCATED
IN THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF SAID AREA AND ·COMMONLY REFERRED TO AS "BRANCH SPRING", AND REFERRED TO ABOVE AS THE PIPED SPRING.

POINT NO.6
TRAT THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND
REFUSING TO FIND, CONCLUDE AND DECREE THAT
THE DEFENDANTS ABOVE NAMED ARE THE OWNERS
OF ALL OF THE WATERS ARISING FROM THAT CERTAIN
AREA KNOWN AND DESCRIBED AS "SPRING AREA NO.
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2" AS DESCRIBED IN THE PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE
IN THIS ·CAUSE AND AS SHOWN ON DEFENDANTS' EXHIBIT "A".

Points 5 and 6 will be argued jointly.
Defendants, by their Counterclaim to quiet title to
Spring Areas 1 and 2, except for the piped spring at
Area No. 1 ( R. 4-8) shouldered the burden of establishing
a valid appropriation to said water prior in time to any
possible claim of the Plaintiff or his predecessors in interest. This was done without waiver of Defendants'
fundamental position herein that the waters described
in the J\1ott-8imper Deed (Exhibit "3") are not in controversy here, but rather as a further protection of Defendant's rights. \Ye take the position that the ultimate
proof of the ownership of the water described in Defendants' Counterclain1 must be found in actual physical appropriation of said water for a beneficial use at a time
prior to that of the Plaintiff's predecessors. See Sowards
et al v. Ill eaglz e1·, supra. For the reasons already pointed
out we assert that the niott-Silnper Deed of 1888 is absolute!)· ineffective to establish ownership of the water involved in this action, and that the only evidence offered
hy Plaintiff, admissible or otherwise, extends no farther
back than 1908. Under the Utah la"T' in the absence of
an)· statutor)· filing upon the water, this is insufficient
aH a matter of law.
\V e will now review Defendants' case showing appropriation and beneficial use of the water from Spring
. . \rea~ 1 and ~ hy their predecessors in interest, starting
in 1887.
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Frank Casto, age 67 at the time of the trial, testified
that he moved to the Gooseberry Canyon area with his
parents, brothers and sisters in 1887 when he was three
years of age (R. 156-157). The family settled on the
property now owned by the Defendants. The original
Casto cabin was built within the bounds of Spring Area
No. :2. rrhe property was taken over from one Henry
Russell, a squatter, (R. 160). Casto stated that he could
recall events back to his fifth )'ear of life (R. 160) and
that he could recall ~Ir. Russell (R. 161). At this time
he observed that the property had been broken up and
some crops had been planted. Russell apparently had
been on the land for several years prior to the coming of
the Castos.
Casto's father, Abel N. Casto, broke up more land,
planted crops, irrigated the property and ultimately patented it (Exhibit ''C"). Frank Casto's earliest childhood
recollections with respect to the use of water on the homestead was that a portion of the water right came from out
of Spring Area No. 1 (R. 162-163). Abel Casto used the
ditches going out from Area K o. 1 which had been constructed by Henry Russell and extended them further
onto the land (R. 163). The witness identified the two
ditches extending from the Northeast and North center
portions of Spring Area No. 1 on Exhibit "A" as being
the same ditches he had helped his father extend and
clean (R. l<i-1--Hi;)). Abel Casto irrigated r> to 8 aeres of
alfalfa north of the Spring An•a No. 1 with this water,
(R. 165), and this continued every summer during Casto's
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ownership of the property and until it was sold to John
~I. Bird (R. 167) after 43 years of ownership. l\1:oreover,
the witness stated that he had personally irrigated the
Casto farn1 with water from Area No. 1 (R. 167). Also,
during all of this time the water from the one piped
spring at the Northwest corner of Area No. 1 had flowed
into the main channel of the wash and down to what is
now the Simper property (R. 174).
Regarding Spring Area No. 2, Casto's earliest recollection was that there was a small spring used for
culinary purposes, but that as irrigation of the property
to the north of Area R o. 1 increased, the flow from Area
No. 2 increased, (R. 170). Thereafter, the water from
a nun1ber of ''seeps" was used to irrigate a meadow and
son1e shade trees east of the main channel of the wash
(R. 171). Later a s1nall pond of water was built by the
witness and his father to catch some of this water. This
pond dried up soon and was not given any name, nor ever
referred to as R-eservoir No.2 (R.176).
Janie Nielsen, F·rank Casto's sister, testified that she
was five years of age at the time the family moved to
Gooseberry and that she could clearly recall events which
occurred the day the family arrived in April, 1887 (R.
20-!). ~lr~. Nielsen stated that as far back as she could
recall she could ren1mnber seeing water flowing through
ditches fr01n Spring Area No. 1 onto her father's property (R. 209) and that she as a young girl often took
]unrhes to her father and brothers while they put up hay
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in the field. Her acquaintance with the property ended
in 1906 when she moved away (R. 210). Mrs. Nielsen's
testimony closely corroborates her brother's story as to
the use and appropriation of the waters from Spring
Areas 1 and 2 and she added that during all of the time
she was on the land no objection was ever made to the
use of the water nor was it ever interferred with by anyone (R. 215).
John :M. Bird, Defendants' next witness, age 55, testified that from the time he was a small child ( 1898) until
1933, he lived in the cabin now belonging to Ernel
Peterson just East of Spring Area No. 1 (R. 231) and
that .:\fr. Bird's father, K. \V. Bird or Kelse)· \V. Bird
ultimately patented the Peterson property. At the time
of Mr. Bird's earliest recollection Abel Casto was farming the property North of Spring Area No. 1 (R. 233).
jfr. Bird recalled that as a young boy he carried water,
a quart at a time, from Spring Area No. 1 and that there
were then two well marked diversionary ditches running
therefrom and onto the Casto property (R. 234) for use
in irrigating crops (R. 235). ~r r. Bird also worked for
.:\Ir. Casto and irrigated the property on several occasions (R. 236) . .Mr. Casto owned the present Thorsen
property from the date of his Patent (1897) to 1933, but
used Spring Area No. 1 waters from 1887.
In 1933, Mr. Bird purchased the Casto property (Exhibit "C"). Mr. Bird identified the appurtenant water
rights referred to in his Deed from Abel Casto and readmg:
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"Any other water that may have been used
upon said land hertofore is hereby expressly reserved from this grant, with the exception of a
spring which rises on the land of K. W. Bird in
the Southwest quarter of the Southrwest quarter
of Section 19, Township 22 South, Range 2 East,
Salt Lake 1\/f eridian, the said Wiater of said sprin9
is to go with this land herein deeded to John M.
Bird,"
as being the wa~er flowing frmn the ditches at the Xortheast Corner and from the North center of Spring Area
No. 1 (R. 238). This is the identical water which had
been used on the property by Abel Casto (R. 239) starting in 1887 and which Mr. Bird continued to use during
the time he owned the Casto property. Mr. Bird irrigated
a pasture and grain field for 13 years (R. 241).
~Ir.

Bird also stated that as far back as he could re-

call the water frmn the so-called "piped spring" had
flowed into the wash ("'C" Ditch) and thence North to
the property of the plaintiff (R. 2-!6). Also, no adverse
rlai1ns to the use or ownership of the water at Spring
Areas 1 or 2 was eYer n1ade by the Plaintiff or third persons during the 2~~ years ~lr. Bird occupied the properties
(R. :2-t'/).

\Vjth reference to Spring Area No. 2, during Mr.
Bird's ownership this water was used for culinary purpo~P~

part of the tin1e (R. 253) and it also irrigated a pas-

ture i1mnediatel:· adjacent to the spring (R. 249).
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Teddy Bird, the brother of John }[. Bird, who lived
in the Frands Peterson Cabin just east of Spring Area
Xo. 1 as a boy and who later obtained a lease on the old
Kelsey Bird property abutting upon the Thorsen land,
corroborated the prior testimony regarding the use made
of the water from Spring Area No. 1 by Abel Casto and
John ~1. Bird (R. 271-272). Mr. Bird stated th'at no adverse claim to the use or ownership of the water had ever
been made to his knowledge except that the Plaintiff had,
on one occasion, complained about the Frands Peterson
fish pond clamming off some of his
ter from the piped
spring (R. 274-275).

,,.a

EvaluteHa Bird, John :JL Bird's wife, and a niece of
the Plaintiff (R.. 278), corroborated her husband's testimony of the use made of the spring waters from Areas
1 and 2 covering the period from the time she married
Mr. Bird in 1923 and moved to the cabin at Spring Area
No. 2 until the property was sold to the Defendants in
1946 (R. 279-282).
Defendant Harry Thorsen, age ;)2 at the time of the
trial, purchased the Abel Casto-J ohn ~~. Bird property
in 1946. His testimony was largely concerned with a <1<·tailed analysis and description of the area involved in
this action with particular regard to Spring Areas 1 and
2, the main channel (Exhibit "A") and the piped ~pring·.
He estimated the total flow of water onto thi~ land

l'ro111

the two ditches at Spring Area No. 1 at one-half ('nhi<'
foot per second (R. 144). Since 1946 he has continuously
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used all of the water from Spring Area No. 1, except for
the piped spring, for the irrigation of 8 acres of alfalfa
and pasture (R. 149-150) and for stock watering. The
water from Spring Area No. 2 has been used to irrigate
a pasture located largely within the boundaries of the
Area itself (R. 153-298) and any excess has been used
elsewhere on his property North of said Area. Prior
to the sumn1er of 1951 no adverse claim hrad been made
to .:\Ir. Thorsen by the Plaintiff or any third person regarding ownership of the water from either Spring Area
No. 1 or Spring Area No. 2 or any part thereof (R. 299).
~Ir. rrhorsen's deed on the former Abel Casto-J'ohn I\1.
Bird farm contained a clause conveying to him "any and
all waters or water rights thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining ... " (Exhibit "G").
The Wellsville East Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay
Land & Livest.ock Co. case, supra, well states the test to
be applied to Defendant's evidence and testilnony for appropriation of the waters from Spring Areas 1 and 2,
except for the piped spring:
"Until1903 when an exclusive method for appropriating water wa8 prescribed by statute,
water could be appropriated n1erely by diverting
the water frmn its natural channel and putting it
to a beneficial use.''
We sub1nit that the Defendant and his witnesses have
established an irrefutable history showing diversion of
\rat<' I' fl'olll Spring Areas 1 and:.? and application of that
water to a beneficial n~e, extending 16 year~ prior to the
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time when the law was changed to eliminate the appropriation of water by diversion and beneficial use. w,e
emphasize again that there is no evidence anywhere in
the record to antedat,e this title. If everything in Plaintiff's case were construed in its 1nost favorable light, if
the lVIott-Simper deed could in some way be construed
to be a valid inception of title, S aid Defendants have
shown that they are prior in time to any possible claim of
Plaintiff and his predecessors to the lawful ownership
of this water. Defendants' case for title to said waters
was based upon the oral testimony of witnesses as to
diversion and beneficial use prior to 1903, that being the
only method by which water could be appropriated in
Utah when Defendants' predecessors appropriated these
waters. The spirit as well as the context of their words
shows that their only interest herein was to relate facts
as they occurred. With the exception of Defendant Thorsen himself, they have no personal interest in this matter
since none of the water involved here will benefit them in
any way. \Ve are impressed with the fact that either
all of them told the truth or all of them deliberately
fashioned a giant falsehood.
1

POINT NO.7
THAT THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL IN THIS
CAUSE.

Appellants make no separate argument under this
point except to state that Rule 59, of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, provides that on a ::\lotion for a New
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Trial, the Court n1ay grant a new trial, a1nend Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law or n1ake new Findings
and Conclusions and direct the entry of a new Judgment
upon the existence of either or both of the following situations, to-wit:

"
( 6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify
the Yerdict or other decision, or that it is
against law.
(7) Error in law."
lTpon the state of the record at the entry of the Decree Quieting Plaintiff's Title, we submit that it ought
to have been apparent to the Court that the record was
shot through with error and that the Decree was unsupportable frmn the evidence and testimony. We respectfully assert that to refuse to an1end the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law or to make new Findings and
Conclusions and to enter a new Decree herein upon the
state of the record before the trial court was an abuse of
judicial discretion.
POINT NO.8
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
FIND IN DEFENDANTS' FAVOR UPON THE ISSUE OF
DEFENDANTS' DAMAGES.

If Defendants are the legal owners of the waters of
Spring Areas 1 and :2, except for the piped spring, as we
are confident we have deuwnstrated to the Court is the
case, then the Defendants are entitled to dmuages for the
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diminution of the value of their crops and animals by
reason of the Plaintiff's admitted taking of their water
during the 1951 crop and feeding season. Bigler et al v.
Fryer, et al, 82 Utah 380, 25 P. 2d 598.
The Bigler v. Fryer case, supra, lays down the rule
of assessment of damages for loss of water by wrongful
diversion by another, to-wit:
''The proper measure of damages for loss of
water through wrongful diversion by another
would be the rental value of the 7 hours of water
lost or, if that be not obtainable, then the loss to
the growing crops as a result of that loss of
water. The correct me asure of damage for the
destruction of growing crops is the difference between the market value of the crops before and
after the alleged damage; that in attempting to
arrive at that damage it is proper to take into
consideration the market value of the crops at maturity if all water had been used and its value
in its injured state because of lack of water."
1

To the same effect see .Jensen c. Burch Creek
Ranch, supra; also Peterson v. Cache Co,nty lhaimt(J('
District, 77 Utah 256, 294 P. 289.

In 1950, the

ye~ar

prior to the taking of most of the

water from Spring Area No. 1 by the Plaintiff, l\1 r.
Thorsen irrigated from Spring Area No. 1 three

aerPH

of alfalfa and also used the water to support a pasture
for fifteen huck sheep (R. 307). The 19·50 yield from the
alfalfa field was a total of approximately 12 tons of J'i r:-;t
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quality alfalfa (R. 307). In 19'50 first grade alfalfa sold
at $30.00 per ton on the market (R. 317). Thus, the market value of the 1950 alfalfa crop would be fixed at
$360.00.
In 1951, after the loss of most of his irrigation water,
Jlr. Thorsen obtained a partial first cutting only from the
alfalfa field for a yield of Vh tons (R. 310). The price
per ton of hay in 1951 remained at $30.00 (R. 317). Thus
the market value of the 1951 alfalfa crop was $45.00.
By subtraction the difference between the market value
of the Defendant's alfalfa crop before and after the damage inflicted thereon by the Plaintiff could have been detennined by the Court to be the sum of $315.00.
In 1950 _Mr. Thorsen 1naintained upon the rest of his
land irrigated from Spring Area No.1 a natural pasture
for 15 buck sheep (R. 308). The natural pasturage had
always been nwre than an1ple to maintain said animals
in excellent condition for breeding purposes ·without any
supplmnental feeding program (R. 308-309). However,
in 1951, because of lack of water available at the pasture,
the natural feed dried up (R. 311) and consequently
said pasture becmne unusable for the 15 buck sheep being
pastured there that sun1mer and Mr. Thorsen was required to renwve the anin1als to his fanu in Salina, Utah,
for supple1nental feeding a 1uonth earlier than usual (R.
312).
Mr. Thorsen, a sheep grazer of \vide experience, described the condition of the bucks as being "poor'' and
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"in bad shape" at the end of the 1951 feeding season and
he attributed this fact solely to the lack of sufficient natural feed during the summer of 1951 (R. 313). The animals were in such poor condition that it was necessary for
Defendant Thorsen to purchase two additional animals
for breeding purposes (R. 315). :Moreover, Thorsen's
1952 lamb crop was of a much poorer quality than usual
and fifty of his ewes did not bear any lambs at all (R.
316-318). This was a marked decrease in the fertility of
his herd, since l\Ir. Thorsen had maintained an average
lamb yield of 125% in the years prior to 1952 (R. 319).
Thorsen estimated his entire loss in this regard, taking
into consideration loss of animals, cost of supplemental
feed, and poor quality of his herd at $1,000.00 (R. 318).
Such an estimate of necessity had to be based upon a
comparative valuation of the herd before and after the
infliction of damage by the Plaintiff. The figure arrived
at by Mr. Thorsen represented his computation of the
difference between the value of his animals before and
after the injury.
vVe submit that the record clearly demonstrates that
Defendants' evidence of damages is neither remote nor
uncertain, but that it fulfills the requirements of law in
every respect, and entitles Defendants to receive from
this Court a Decree awarding to them damages in the
sum of $1,315.00.
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CONCLUSION
Appellants urge upon the Court the necessity of a
reversal of the lower trial Court's Decree because it is at
once apparent from the record that, in addition to the fact
that there is no admissible evidence to support the Decree in Plaintiff's favor herein, the record is replete with
fully adn1issible and creditable evidence and testimony
of Defendants' title to the waters in issue. \Y e are
frankly unable to understand the matter or motive which
i1npelled the trial Court to cast aside Defendants' entire
case and to clothe with the dignity and force of law this
unblushing "water grab" by the Plaintiff, especially in
view of the complete absence of any proof to support
Plaintiff's contended ownership. l\Iay we invite consideration of this salient fact: If the Plaintiff or his
father seriously entertained belief that the waters of
Spring Areas 1 or 2, except for the piped spring, belonged
to the1n, ·2rhy did they stand by for 64 years, from 1887
to 1951, years during which they farmed side by side with
the Defendant Thors,en and his predecessors in title, and
z;ermit the constant and unint,errupted use of these
1raters by Defendant and his predecessors, 1citlwut 1raging a single protest! There is but one reason; because

Plaintiff and his father before hun knew in their hearts
and their u1inds that the only water they owned from
('ither Npring Areas 1 or :2 was the one piped spring.
.. \IHl they had ahn1~~s received the full Ineasure of this
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water until Frands Peterson dammed it off for his fish
pond. Ther,e is not one word irn the record to dispute
this fact. In view of Plaintiff's unconsciona:ble delay in
asserting his claim there can be no doubt that Plaintiff
and his father well knew that the Matt-Simper deed referred to only the piped spring and to one of the several
storage reservoirs located at the top of the Gooseberry
drainage area, some 8 miles frmn the farms of the
Plaintiff and Defendants.
The plain fact of the matter is that the quantity of
irrigation water in Gooseberry Canyon is becoming
smaller yearly ... an unhappy condition which is becoming more and more common in this arid country.
Appellants can offer no explanation for the commencement of this action other than that Leland Simper seized
upon the desperate opportunity to purloin some of his
neighbor's water rights. This is the most onerous of all
types of litigation.
Even so, Plaintiff did not have the temerity to seek
by his Complaint a Decree quieting title to any alleged
water rights, but instead sought to accomplish almost
the same result by indirection in suing for damageH
based on an alleged ownership. The trial Court refused
to award Plaintiff damages, but instead "assumed" Plaintiff's title to something he did not own and quieted title
in him. This was done despite and in the face of a emnplete record of evidence requiring the opposite n·~ ult.
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We respectfully urge upon this Honorable Court the
necessity of correcting the injustice which has accrued
to the Defendants in this action and of reversing the
trial Court's Judgment.
Respectfully submitted,

CARVEL MATTSSON
AND

JOHN T. VERNIEU
FOR
GusTIN, RICHARDS

&

MATTSSON

Attorneys for Defendants and
A. ppellants
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